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Abstract 
Tin Shui Wai new town in Hong Kong, known as the “city of sadness”, has 
been narrated by the “Tin Shui Wai Myth” that attributes its urban problems 
to the planning failures after the colonial government rescued the 
developers, including a Chinese red capital, from a market slump in the early 
1980s. This myth creates misunderstandings which confuse recent debates 
about new town development and regional integration with China. To 
debunk this myth, this article, based on archival research, analyses the scalar 
politics of new town planning and explains why the government decided to 
purchase the land and develop it in a partnership with these developers. It 
sheds new light on how the regional dynamics in South China after the 
economic reforms prompted China and Britain to react to the new town 
proposal at inter-connected and contested spatial scales, before the 
diplomatic negotiations about this British colony’s future officially started. 
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While diplomacy is usually regarded as geopolitical relations in which state 
powers negotiate and interact at the international scale, such a perspective 
tends to be relatively abstract and overlooks the concrete significance of 
urban space to it. The historical account of the significant episodes in the 
transition period of Hong Kong from a British colony to a special 
administrative region in China mostly begins with two key moments: 
Governor Murray MacLehose’s ice-breaking visit to Beijing in 1979, and the 
meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Margaret Thatcher which marked the 
beginning of Sino-British Negotiations in 1982. But what happened between 
these two moments is often neglected. In this article, I aim to not only 
discuss this gap period of diplomatic relations but also argue that there is a 
rarely discussed urban history engaging with scalar politics, with a particular 
focus on the planning and development of Tin Shui Wai (TSW) new town.  
 Being a home to nearly 300,000 people, TSW in the New Territories 
has been dubbed the “city of sadness” for its urban and social problems 
(Figure 1). The dominant narrative, which I call “Tin Shui Wai Myth”, 
attributes these problems to urban planning failures after the government 
purchased back the land lease from a consortium that included a Chinese 
red capital developer, China Resources Company (CRC), to rescue it from a 
market slump in 1982 1 . A myth is not only a commonly believed but 
inaccurate narrative, but also, following Alan Smart, having “a mythical 
quality in the more positive sense”2. I argue this myth inaccurately implies 
the colonial government should solely bear the responsibility and neglects 
the current regime’s interests involved, though the development benefited 
the Chinese state enterprise and facilitated regional integration with China. 
Consequently, this myth positively resonates with the authority of Hong 
Kong government under Chinese sovereignty to push forward new 
development and integration projects as long as proper planning procedures 
are claimed to be followed. This myth has not been challenged thus far and 
continues to confuse the debates. This obscures the wider implications of 
new town development processes and its potential for producing new 
knowledge about colonial urban governance in Hong Kong and the 
diplomatic relations between China and Britain. 
 
1 “City of Sadness Fear for New Towns in New Territories,” South China Morning Post, 
5 July 2013. 
2 Alan Smart, The Shek Kip Mei Myth: Squatters, Fires and Colonial Rule in Hong Kong, 
1950 - 1963 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 2. 
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Figure 1: Map of Hong Kong showing the locations of Tin Shui Wai and 
other places mentioned in this article 
 
 In this article, the timeframe under consideration is from the first 
development proposal in 1979 up to the making of its first master plan in 
1983. Being leased to Britain, the land lease of the New Territories, the 
largest proportion of land in Hong Kong, was to expire in 1997, therefore 
the land leases of individual land lots were affected because of the leasehold 
land system. This legal problem of land gave rise to growing political and 
economic concerns after the Second World War, especially as time 
proceeded. As I will show, soon after MacLehose’s 1979 Beijing visit, 
approving the red capital’s new town proposal was believed to offer political 
advantages to the colonial authority in handling the pressing land lease 
problem for realizing governance goals. Red capital refers to the firms 
owned or controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese state 
in Hong Kong, which emerged soon after the establishment of the Party in 
the 1920s, as the history of CRC can be traced back to the Party’s investment 
in Hong Kong in the 1930s3. These firms increasingly influence the local 
 
3 Xuexian Wu, Red China Resources Company [红色华润] (Beijing, China: Zhonghua 
Shuju, 2010).  
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economy4. Following rounds of liaising and negotiation lasting almost three 
years, the colonial government publicly announced the TSW project in July 
1982, two months before Deng and Thatcher, the leaders of the two states, 
met to initiate Sino-British negotiations. This process shows the issue at 
stake was neither a planning mistake nor an effort to rescue the developers; 
but a series of political calculations through which different actors at various 
geographical scales attempted to tease out how the two state powers would 
handle the question of Hong Kong’s future. TSW was the first-ever new 
town planning exercise in Hong Kong that largely considered China’s 
interests, revealing the ever-changing regional dynamics during the 
economic reform. These scalar politics were reflected in the plan-making 
process.  
 Scale, often taken-for-granted as “the nested hierarchy of bounded 
spaces of differing size”5, is embedded in the conventional imaginary of the 
colonial governance. Conventionally, the political order in colonial societies 
has been described as being “coercively imposed from above by the colonial 
authorities”6, implying a top-down model of power relations and assuming 
a passive role of the colonial government. However, viewing scale as a priori 
downplays the workings of power. One must beware of the danger of 
simplifying the historical account into a linear narrative of, for example, how 
London instructed MacLehose to work out the policies. As Yep suggests, we 
need to “go beyond the formal constitutional order in deciphering the 
relationship between London and the colony before 1997”7. Constitutional 
subordination does not imply the colony accepts all the instructions. 
Disagreements and debates between scales involve certain political 
contingencies8. A more contemporary understanding of scale considers it as 
 
4 Siu-Keung Cheung, “Reunification through Water and Food: The Other Battle for 
Lives and Bodies in China’s Hong Kong Policy,” The China Quarterly 220 (2014): 
1012–32; Heidi Wang-Kaeding and Malte Philipp Kaeding, “Red Capital in Hong 
Kong,” Asian Education and Development Studies 8, no. 2 (2019): 149–60. 
5 David Delaney and Helga Leitner, “The Political Construction of Scale,” Political 
Geography 16, no. 2 (1997): 93–7. 
6 Siu-Kai Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
1984), 5. 
7  Ray Yep, “A Historical Perspective on Hong Kong Autonomy: Traditions of British 
Imperialism, Maritime Enclave and Contending Views of British Interest,” in Hong 
Kong 20 Years after the Handover, ed. Brian C.H. Fong and Tai-Lok Lui (Springer, 
2018), 231–54, 250. 
8 Ray Yep, “The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: The Diplomatic and Domestic Fronts of 
the Colonial Governor,” The China Quarterly 193 (2008): 122–39. 
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a political construction, being constituted by objects and processes as the 
territorial expression of evolving power relations9. Work on territoriality 
suggests that human adopts spatial strategies, such as territorial planning, 
to affect a geographical area for conditioning political spaces 10 . Scalar 
politics pays attention to the “strategic deployment of scale by various actors, 
movements and organisations”11. Empirical research, accordingly, looks into 
“the contested processes through which different scales are interconnected 
to each other via shifting power relations”12. In other words, it traces how 
various actors strategically associate a specific category of scale with the 
territorial and material relations. As Shin discusses, local-central state 
relations often engage with scalar politics. To realize certain goals, visions 
and plans, actors at the local scale would sometimes bypass the upper scale 
and directly jump to a more superior scale, without diminishing the nation-
state scale13. Different actors negotiate with each other to test the limit of 
their power and plan for their desired future. In this article, I demonstrate 
TSW’s engagement with scalar politics is reflected in the planning process, 
displaying how the local scale has been tied with multiple scales. 
Undoubtedly, TSW has its material conditions as it is bounded and fixed at 
a location in a physical and absolute view of land. The scales of TSW are, 
however, multiple. Because of the land lease problem, the development of 
TSW at the local scale has been tied with the international, national and 
regional scales during a political process to favor various interests.  
 To tell such a story, I used declassified archival materials from the 
British National Archives and Hong Kong Government Public Records 
Office to reconstruct the process of decision-making. It is noteworthy that, 
in the British Archives, correspondences relating to TSW were filed into 
folders on “Future of Hong Kong” maintained by the Foreign and 
 
9 Delaney and Leitner, “The Political Construction of Scale”; Danny MacKinnon, 
“Reconstructing Scale: Towards a New Scalar Politics,” Progress in Human Geography 
35, no. 1 (2011): 21–36. 
10 Robert Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986). 
11 MacKinnon, “Reconstructing Scale”, 32. 
12 Adrian J. Bailey, Suresh Canagarajah, Shanshan Lan and Devereux Gong Powers, 
“Scalar Politics, Language Ideologies, and the Sociolinguistics of Globalization 
among Transnational Korean Professionals in Hong Kong,” Journal of Sociolinguistics 
20, no. 3 (2016): 312-34, 315. 
13  Hyun Bang Shin, “Urban Spatial Restructuring, Event-led Development and 
Scalar Politics,” Urban Studies 51, no. 14 (2014): 2961-2978. 
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Commonwealth Office (FCO), instead of folders about urban development. 
This implies that TSW was considered extraordinarily significant to the 
colony’s future. Recent archival studies on Hong Kong reject the taken-for-
granted and fruitfully produce rigorous analyses, offering new insights into 
the colonial governance 14 . As the archived materials were intended for 
exclusive internal uses among government officials, they are informative for 
understanding the motivations undergirding decision-making processes. 
Nevertheless, they have an official nature and speak for Britain’s interest, 
therefore in order to verify the accounts, wherever possible, I also compared 
them with the materials representing Chinese and Hong Kong voices, 
including CRC archives and politicians’ memoirs. In this article, following 
the usual practice, the word “London” is used as a metonymy for the 
decision-makers and state leaders in the government of Britain, while 
“Beijing” refers to those of China.  
  This article proceeds in four sections. In the next section, I briefly 
introduce new town planning in Hong Kong which frames the urban context 
of TSW. Then, based on recent archival works, I revisit the political context 
in the 1970s, known as the “MacLehose Years”, to clarify the political 
agenda of the colonial governance which is significant to understanding 
those decisions relating to TSW. These two sections are intentionally 
concise for making room to report my original research on the scalar politics 
of the TSW project in detail within the diplomatic context between Britain 
and China. I conclude this article by discussing the implications of this story 
in terms of advancing the understanding of Hong Kong’s transition period 
and recent controversies, as well as the urban dimension of diplomacy which 
engages with scalar politics.  
 
14 Tai-lok Lui, “‘Flying MPs’ and Political Change in a Colonial Setting: Political 
Reform under MacLehose’s Governorship of Hong Kong,” in Civil Unrest and 
Governance in Hong Kong: Law and Order from Historical and Cultural Perspectives, ed. 
Michael H.K. Ng and John D Wong (London: Routledge, 2017), 76–96; Tai-Lok Lui, 
Wing Kai Stephen Chiu, and Ray Yep, “Introduction: The Long Transition,” in 
Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-Lok Lui, Wing Kai Stephen 
Chiu, and Ray Yep (Routledge, 2019), 1–29; Alan Smart and Tai-lok Lui, “Learning 
from Civil Unrest: State/Society Relations in Hong Kong before and after the 1967 
Disturbances,” in May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967, ed. Robert 
Bickers and Ray Yep (Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 145–60; Ray Yep, “A 
Historical Perspective on Hong Kong Autonomy”; Ray Yep and Tai-Lok Lui, 
“Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms,” 
China Information 24, no. 3 (2010): 249–72. 
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Tin Shui Wai Myth 
Except for one church site, leasehold is the only land tenure in Hong Kong 
since the 1840s 15 . During the Nineteenth Century, the Qing Empire 
perpetually ceded the Island and Kowloon and leased the New Territories, 
for 99 years starting from 1898, to Britain. The colonial government, as the 
landlord, utilized this same legal mechanism to govern the whole territory16. 
After the Second World War, especially after the 1970s, the development of 
new towns decentralized the rapidly growing population from the ceded area 
to the leased area17. It was almost the only practical planning solution to the 
population problem, but the planning and development process was not 
without difficulties. The colonial government needed to deal with the 
customary land practices in indigenous villages, meaning that the land 
disputes were subject to not only the leasehold tenure but also consents 
from all village managers and the cultural traditions18. Another difficulty is 
the financial problem because developing new towns is a huge commitment 
in the long run, including the cost of land reclamation and urban 
infrastructure. Yet, the outcome of these planning exercises is seemingly 
satisfactory, as most of the new towns are planned with appropriate land 
use zoning and developed “as self-sufficient integrated communities, 
alleviating the burden of the core urban districts”19. It is a popular discourse 
that residents in new towns, such as Sha Tin and Tai Po, are proud of their 
local identity, and these towns are usually modelled as successful planning 
cases. On the contrary, TSW is described as the failed new town. During the 
early 2000s, several family tragedies in TSW drew public attention to its 
 
15 Say Hak Goo and Alice Lee, Land Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: LexisNexis, 2015). 
16 Sui-Wai Cheung, “Landlords, Squatters, and Tenants: Fundamental Concepts of 
Land Administration in Early Colonial Hong Kong,” in Colonial Administration and 
Land Reform in East Asia, ed. Sui-Wai Cheung (Routledge, 2017), 21–36. 
17 Pui-Yin Ho, Making Hong Kong: A History of Its Urban Development (Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar, 2018), 190.  
18 James Hayes, Tsuen Wan: Growth of a ‘New Town’ and Its People (New York: Oxford, 
1993). 
19 Ho, Making Hong Kong, 275. 
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urban social problems20. The government officials labelled it as “city of 
sadness”21  and sought solutions by providing more social supports and 
conducting planning reviews.  
 This exceptional case of a “failed” new town has attracted the 
interests of researchers who identified two major problems with its urban 
planning. Firstly, spatial mismatch and lack of community facilities are 
considered as consequences of technical planning failures. Remotely located 
in the north-western corner of the New Territories, TSW’s low proximity to 
urban core and major employment centers made daily commuting costly and 
time-consuming 22 . Residential land use dominates one-fourth of area, 
having an above-average ratio of public housing among the new towns23. 
This problematic explanation assumes urban planning as a mere technical 
activity, and planning failure could be avoided once a scientific and 
comprehensive procedure is followed, while neglecting that urban planning 
is a process of dealing with territorial politics. Secondly, the proliferation of 
unaffordable retail businesses controlled by private developers, and the lack 
of job opportunities, are regarded as outcomes of a deal between the colonial 
government and the consortium in 1982, as a government-commissioned 
analysis conducted by academics24 and the journalistic reports25 suggested. 
 
20 Bidisha Banerjee, “Looking beyond ‘Buildings of Chrome and Glass’: Hong Kong’s 
‘Uncanny Postcoloniality’ in Photographs of Tin Shui Wai,” Visual Studies 32, no. 1 
(2017): 60–69; Kwok Kin Fung and Suet Lin Hung, “Strengthening a Community 
of Poverty in an Affluent Society: Strategies to Build Social Capital in Tin Shui Wai 
North in Hong Kong,” Community Development Journal 49, no. 3 (2014): 441–57; Cho-
Yam Joseph Lau, “The Influence of Suburbanization on the Access to Employment 
of Workers in the New Towns: A Case Study of Tin Shui Wai, Hong Kong,” Habitat 
International 34, no. 1 (2010): 38–45; Tina L. Rochelle, “Diversity and Trust in Hong 
Kong: An Examination of Tin Shui Wai, Hong Kong’s ‘City of Sadness,’” Social 
Indicators Research 120, no. 2 (2015): 437–54. 
21 “Carrie Lam: Tin Shui Wai is a City of Sadness” (trans.), Ming Pao, 9 July 2006. 
22 Lau, “The Influence of Suburbanization on the Access to Employment of Workers 
in the New Towns”; Hung Wong, “Quality of Life of Poor People Living in Remote 
Areas in Hong Kong,” Social Indicators Research 100, no. 3 (2011): 435–50. 
23 Tin Shui Wai Outline Zoning Plan (S/TSW/13), gazetted on 26 May 2017 . 
24 Chi-Kwong Law et al., “A Study on the Tin Shui Wai New Town: The Planning 
and Development Process” (Hong Kong: Planning Department, 2009). This study 
was part of the North East New Territories New Development Areas Planning Study 
in the late 2000s. 
25 “Colonial Deal Built ‘City of Sadness’,” South China Morning Post, 6 December 2010.  
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This accused the colonial government of favoring the business sector, 
without contextualizing planning and deal-making processes.  
 Yet, these findings leave out the historical geography of the land of 
TSW and the two state powers – China and Britain. Virtually no attempt is 
made to explore why and how the agreement was reached, except Wing-
Shing Tang’s work26. Undoubtedly, Tang has made an enormous long-term 
contribution that called for critical reading of new town planning in Hong 
Kong. But I argue that his argument which was articulated in mass media 
has also contributed to creating the myth. Tang argues that the colonial 
government rescued a failed private investment to secure the land 
development regime of Hong Kong. The conventional imaginaries about the 
colonial governance, that the colonial government at the local scale has a 
relatively passive and minor role in diplomatic negotiations, limited his 
analysis, which will be addressed through the lens of scalar politics in this 
article. Of immediate interest, his analysis relies on an earlier work by Roger 
Bristow who asserted that the colonial government inevitably decided to 
rescue this project from the market slump27. Bristow offered an analysis 
quickly in the 1980s when TSW was still undergoing sorts of controversies. 
His conclusions made sense for him, provided that he could, at the time of 
writing, only collect information from sources at his reach. But the 
narratives from this, with the absence of the two state powers in the 
discussion, became mythical.  
 In examining the history of new towns, Bristow correctly 
documented that the government bought the developers’ landholding in 
TSW and developed it together in 1982. However, two problems are 
noteworthy. The first is the location. He asserted TSW was in the “general 
area” of the development areas recommended by the Special Committee of 
Land Production in 197728. Although the succeeding policy and academic 
 
26 Wing-Shing Tang, Tin Shui Wai: Is It a Matter of Inadequate Provision?, Occasional 
Paper Series 82, Hong Kong: The Centre for China Urban and Regional Studies, 
Hong Kong Baptist University, 2008; Wing-Shing Tang, A Historical-Geographical 
Perspective of the Social Problems in Tin Shui Wai New Town, Hong Kong [香港天
水围新市镇社会问题的历史地理观], China Ancient City [中国名城] 7, 2009: 19–25. 
They stimulated discussions about TSW and urban planning in Hong Kong, 
especially during the “Land Debate” in 2018 on mass media including Ming Pao, 
HK01, the Stand News, and In-media, to name a few. 
27  Roger Bristow, Hong Kong’s New Towns: A Selective Review (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
28 Ibid., 215. 
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studies followed Bristow’s account, a careful reading of the report and its 
map undoubtedly reveals the area in the south to TSW was instead 
recommended29. This is important for explaining the developers’ decision-
making, as will be demonstrated. The second problem is his unjustified 
assertations about the land resumption. Bristow quoted some reports to 
assert that the government originally proposed to postpone the TSW project 
due to other infrastructural commitments including the new airport. Here, 
yet, this was only the advisory committee’s suggestion. Bristow then 
attributed the change of government’s decision, from project postponement 
to land resumption, to the property market downturn, hence “the 
Government was thus forced by political considerations to intervene”30. 
Bristow did not give any evidence here. He continued, “the consortium 
resisted this initial reaction, arguing that on viability grounds it required all 
or nothing for the scheme”, but he could not explain, if the consortium was 
facing difficulties, why it was able to have the bargaining power to negotiate 
with the government. Bristow then wrote31,  
[t]he property slump of that year pressurized the developers to settle, 
and as the Government knew that serious negotiations with China 
on the future of Hong Kong were about to get under way, they were 
already aware that any collapse of the Tin Shui Wai scheme, given 
that Chinese involvement in it, would be highly and seriously 
embarrassing.  
But, once again, no evidence was given. This is how the partial and mistaken 
myth was made. Then, why did MacLehose’s government decide to resume 
TSW and develop it in a partnership with the consortium? Answering this 
question has to begin with clarifications about colonial governance and its 
ultimate goal, which allow us to better understand the political reasons 
behind the decision. 
Revisiting the “MacLehose Years” through archives 
People termed the 1970s as the “MacLehose Years” to give credit to 
Governor MacLehose, who entered the office in 1971 and left the colony in 
1982, for initiating many reforms. MacLehose received loud applause for 
bringing sudden changes as widely perceived. This stereotypical imaginary 
persisted until the recent archival research told another story. The archives 
 
29 Special Committee on Land Production, “Report of the Special Committee on 
Land Production” (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977). 
30 Bristow, Hong Kong’s New Towns, 219. 
31 Ibid. 
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show the Governor, who was left with the last word in decision-making in 
the British coloniality32, did not resolute as what we commonly think33.  
 Above all, the political agenda throughout MacLehose’s 
governorship was to widen the gap between Hong Kong and China by 
transforming the colony to an advanced status which China could hardly 
absorb, and which can only be governed by Britain to sustain its long-term 
interest34. It was because, during the re-organization of world order after the 
Second World War, the land lease problem concerned Britain who desired 
to safeguard this colony for their interest in Far East. This question was even 
urgently pressing when MacLehose was appointed. As an experienced 
diplomat, he continued the on-going tasks with his “government in a 
hurry” 35  for approaching a special status of Hong Kong after 1997. 
MacLehose had repeatedly communicated with London about this ambition 
during his tenure. In his view, advancing Hong Kong into a model city was 
the only way for Britain to keep Hong Kong because this colony was not 
defensible if China decided to take it violently, as what Britain had learnt 
from the pro-Communist-China 1967 riots against the British colonial rule36. 
Similarly, Lui also found the China factor had put forward the longer-term 
planning and social reforms, but it was also a political constraint 37 . 
Maintaining the equilibrium in Hong Kong from which both Britain and 
China could gain was important for MacLehose.  
 For realizing this governance goal of his tenure, MacLehose launched 
a ten-year housing programme in 1972 to construct public works that are 
 
32 Yep and Lui, “Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social 
Reforms.” 
33 Lui, “‘Flying MPs’ and Political Change in a Colonial Setting”; Smart and Lui, 
“Learning from Civil Unrest”; Ray Yep, “The Crusade against Corruption in Hong 
Kong in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a Zealous Reformer or Reluctant Hero?,” 
China Information 27, no. 2 (2013): 197–221. 
34 Pang-kwong Li, Governing Hong Kong [管治香港] (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Smart and Lui, “Learning from Civil Unrest”; Yep and Lui, “Revisiting 
the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms”; Yep, “A 
Historical Perspective on Hong Kong Autonomy.” 
35 John Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); 
Smart and Lui, “Learning from Civil Unrest”; Lui, “‘Flying MPs’ and Political 
Change in a Colonial Setting.” 
36 Li, Governing Hong Kong, 22. 
37 Lui, “‘Flying MPs’ and Political Change in a Colonial Setting.” 
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essential to modern life38. Constructing new towns was crucial to achieving 
the aim of accommodating 1.8 million people in public housing estates in 
ten years, but two major uncertainties might hinder the progress. Firstly, 
the demands for urban infrastructure posed a public finance challenge. The 
second uncertainty was the land lease problem. Bankers worried the 15-year 
mortgage of real estate could not go beyond 1997, and developers were 
afraid that their land leases could not be renewed upon the expiry 39 . 
Meanwhile, the financialization of the real estate market, that enabled the 
local capital to compete with the British capital in the game, created land 
demand. To entertain its governing partners in the business sector, 
MacLehose’s government established the Special Committee on Land 
Production in 1977 to conduct a land study which excluded land which 
might involve clearances, the Lantau, Hong Kong Island and country parks40. 
That means, only the potentials of developing New Territories were 
studied41. But developing the New Territories was concerned with the land 
lease problem, urging MacLehose to raise it to China.  
 Meanwhile, a series of changes happened in China – the death of 
Mao Zedong, the end of Cultural Revolution, the rise of Deng Xiaoping and 
the announcement of economic reform and modernization. MacLehose 
maintained a friendly distance with China and recognized the Xinhua News 
Agency Hong Kong Branch as an unofficial Chinese government 
representative in this colony. In 1978, he raised the land lease problem to 
Wang Kuang, Xinhua’s new director; but Beijing decided to postpone the 
answer due to the principle of “taking long-term views and taking full 
advantage”42. Yet, the Chinese leaders invited MacLehose to visit Beijing for 
seeking support from Hong Kong to their economic reform. London and 
MacLehose considered it as an opportunity to discuss the land lease problem. 
Being the British Ambassador to China, Percy Cradock wrote in his memoir 
that he was personally not particularly optimistic about the outcome, but 
MacLehose’s government had a contrasting view by suggesting that “the 
 
38 18 October 1972, Hong Kong Hansard.  
39 Bangyan Feng, A Century of Hong Kong Real Estate Development [香港地產業百年] 
(Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2001). 
40 20 April 1977, Hong Kong Hansard. 
41 Special Committee on Land Production, “Report of the Special Committee on 
Land Production.” 
42 Ping Lu, Ping Lu’s Oral History about the Reunification of Hong Kong [魯平口述香港回
歸] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2009). 
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Chinese were concerned primarily with economic reform and that 
nationalist considerations came second”43. This view from the man-on-the-
spot framed the tactics of the British side44.  
 During their meeting on 29 March 1979, although MacLehose would 
like to mention to Deng the question of Hong Kong’s future, it was Deng 
who first raised this question45. Deng told MacLehose that he hoped Britain 
not to raise the problem too early and he had no policy about Hong Kong 
yet, but whether or not Hong Kong would maintain the status quo or be 
resumed by China, there would be special policies so the investors can rest 
their hearts at ease46. In fact, one must note that, on the contrary to some 
analyses47, Beijing had no ideas about handling the question of Hong Kong, 
and the preliminary proposal of the basic policies only began to emerge in 
mid-1982, according to various memoirs48.  
 Immediately, MacLehose responded to Deng that sovereignty was 
the long-term matter for the Chinese and British governments, but “the 
question of New Territories leases was one which could not be dealt with 
by general assurances and would not wait” 49 . MacLehose proposed to 
 
43 Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994), 166. 
44 Admittedly, there were internal debates in Britain on this question which lasted 
for decades. Despite Cradock’s idea that it was the other way around and the 
nationalist considerations were prioritized in the Chinese mind, similar discussions 
were evidenced by their review of 1967 riots in which London recognized China’s 
emphasis on nationalism and saw that the Communist Chinese government would 
not allow any extension of the lease of Hong Kong in the late 1960s. See Yep and 
Lui, “Revisiting the Golden Era of MacLehose and the Dynamics of Social Reforms”, 
120. But, as discussed here, it was evident that Britain tended to bet on playing the 
treaties card. 
45 30 March 1979, Cradock to FCO, FCO40/1058: Future of Hong Kong: New 
Territories leases (Part A). 1979; Sze-Yuen Chung, Hong Kong’s Journey to 
Reunification: Memoirs of Sze-Yuen Chung (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, 2001), 31. 
46 Ibid. See also Wen-fang Huang, China’s Resumption of Sovereignty over Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: David C. Lam Institute for East-West Studies, Hong Kong Baptist 
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replace the expiry date of the leases with the phrase “as long as Britain 
administered the New Territories” because this was a very concrete issue in 
the legal technicalities of land lease in Hong Kong. As Cradock wrote, this 
idea of blurring the 1997 deadline came “either from the Governor or from 
one of his advisers” and was to be presented as “a technical and commercial 
matter, as a means of sustaining investment”50. Here, Deng “appeared to 
accept that all that was proposed was the removal of the terminal date in 
leases, and that this required no Chinese action and did not conflict with 
the Chinese position”51. Deng’s response was ambiguous as it meant neither 
agree nor disagree. MacLehose subsequently explained the same proposal 
to other key cadres including Huang Hua, the Foreign Minister, and Liao 
Chengzhih, who had responsibility for Hong Kong affairs. No one endorsed 
but also no rejection. Britain found that the Chinese leadership simply did 
not understand what the land lease problem was, as David Owen reported 
“Deng evidently found it difficult to grasp the English legal concepts 
involved”52. This is convincing because, otherwise, the Chinese leadership 
had no need to invite the professionals from Hong Kong to advise on the 
reform of land law in the 1980s 53 . Interestingly, as Carroll writes, 
“MacLehose returned to Hong Kong relieved and optimistic”54. Cradock 
recalled in his memoir that, after the Beijing visit, “[t]he Hong Kong 
government still hoped that economic realities would press upon the 
Chinese and bring them round to a more co-operative attitude”55. Lui’s 
archival research reports a similar observation that, as both the British 
Labour Government, until May 1979, and the succeeding Conservative 
Government had not yet thought about political transition which was later 
only triggered by the Sino-British negotiations, MacLehose was confident 
that Britain can undoubtedly rely on the three treaties to continue the 
colonial governance56.  
 In November 1979, MacLehose and Wang Kuang met. MacLehose 
still remained his optimism and expressed his willingness to contribute 
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Hong Kong to the modernization of China and promised to plan some cargo 
facilities for exclusively serving China’s shipping business as an 
“exceptional arrangement”57. With this opportunity, MacLehose also raised 
the land lease problem. MacLehose’s government perceived a message that 
Wang “was advising us to wait until the political and economic scene in 
China, and in Guangdong in particular, had stabilised further”. Wang also 
suggested having more investments on both sides of the border could help 
assurances. MacLehose then asked “whether ‘investment’ included ‘real 
estate’”, and Wang replied, “it included both, and both in the New 
Territories and on Hong Kong Island”. MacLehose wanted to keep what had 
been discussed confidential and did not wish the members of the Councils 
would know anything about this meeting, and Wang agreed. In December, 
Xi Zhongxun, the Chairman of Guangdong Revolutionary Committee, 
visited Hong Kong and, regarding the land lease problem, “appeared to be 
following the same line of thought as that of Wang Kuang” 58 . It is 
noteworthy that the Chinese state is internally complex and contested, and 
these speeches from the local cadres might not necessarily reflect the mind 
of the central leadership but the interests of the local forces who strived for 
better performance amidst the economic reform. Nevertheless, these 
exchanges encouraged MacLehose to continue his task. The above political 
context is significant for explaining scalar politics in planning TSW after 
MacLehose had received the development proposal in January 1980, to 
which I now turn.  
Scalar politics of planning  
In this section, I report an analysis of the scalar politics by which I argue 
that, as discussed, the new town planning process was an exercise of various 
strategies adopted by different actors, under the conditions of imperfect 
information and shifting power relations, who attempted to link up the 
territorial events to specific categories of scale for realizing their respective 
goals and visions. In what follows, I begin with the territorial history of TSW, 
documenting how the developers obtained the right to hold the land and 
why they chose this piece of land. Then, I move on to report how the 
governments of Hong Kong, Britain and China reacted to the consortium’s 
new town proposal. It is situated within the aforementioned urban and 
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political contexts of the colony’s future. These contexts were full of 
uncertainty, as each side knew little about others. The intention of each 
subtle act by one was unknown to other involved actors, so the actors 
wanted to tease out what others were thinking about at multiple scales. Yet, 
the story will reveal that their attempts during the negotiations were simply 
a contingent sequence of misunderstandings, and they failed to correctly 
guess the unknown, which somehow led to the making of urban plans.  
 As will be seen, this development proposal at the local scale had been 
associated with the international scale, where London treated it as a 
rehearsal of the diplomatic negotiations over their colonial governance 
which might possibly happen. Soon after London knew that the 
participation of Beijing was less than minor, and that the local developers 
had exaggerated their self-claimed capacity as representing the interests of 
Beijing, Britain realized it was impossible to resolve the land lease problem 
with this episode. But MacLehose’s government did not give up this 
proposal because they believed TSW could be an unusual opportunity to 
facilitate regional development in South China and thus favor China’s 
economic reform, which could in turn offer advantages to sustaining the 
colonial governance as it was the goal of his tenure. These dynamics at 
multiple scales resulted in legal changes, infrastructural development 
strategies and a new town urban plan at the local scale.  
The land of Tin Shui Wai 
Before it was named Tin Shui Wai, the area was a muddy embayment named 
Ha Tsuen Wan. It became part of the new grant lots owned and managed by 
the colonial government because the Tang clan, the indigenous villagers 
who settled nearby and had been practicing oyster farming there, did not 
claim their customary rights to this wetland during the land survey at the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century. Villagers did not declare the land titles 
because of taxation concern 59  and their trust in the validity of their 
customary land rights from the Qing Empire60. In the 1910s, the Chiu family 
moved from the unstable South China to Hong Kong and proposed to 
reclaim this 500-hectare wetland. The government approved and leased 
them the land, considering it as an opportunity to weaken the Tang clan 
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who had fiercely opposed the colonial government when it was taking over 
the leased area 61 . This was how the government utilized the leasehold 
system to restrain the local forces. The Chiu family named the land Tin Shui 
Wai, where large-scale rice production and commercial fishponds took place 
successively until the 1970s62.  
 As mentioned, the Special Committee recommended to develop the 
areas near TSW, i.e. Fung Kong Tsuen and Lau Fau Shan. The report 
disclosed that the Public Works Department consultants were already 
conducting planning studies there as part of the Yuen Long new town 
development project. This internal information was made publicly known 
with the publication of this report, implying the government might invest 
to provide infrastructure and public works in this area soon. This reported 
hinted the developers who were eager to tease out the government’s plan of 
urban development. Cheung Kong Holdings, established by Li Ka-Shing in 
1971, also followed this report and deployed its resources. Cheung Kong 
had been acquiring land in the New Territories and started to place their 
hands on TSW in 1978. It took around two years to purchase more-than-
half of shares of Luen Tak Company which “owns some 52 million sq. ft. of 
agricultural land at Tin Shui Wai, Yuen Long. The area thus attributable to 
the Group is about 25 million sq. ft. Preliminary plans for the development 
of this site are being made and the Group believes that this project has 
considerable potential”63. Cheung Kong had an ambitious plan about TSW 
as a map in their annual report showed residential, commercial and 
industrial sites shall be developed there. Meanwhile, a shareholder of Luen 
Tak challenged Cheung Kong’s purchase, but the court decision in 1978 
ruled that the purchase was legal64. This prompted Cheung Kong to invite 
partners to this project, including Wheelock and Trafalgar.  
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 Moreover, Cheung Kong in 1979 invited a partner that no one could 
have ever expected – CRC, which was established by the Chinese 
Communist Party in pre-war Hong Kong65. A proportion of shares of Luen 
Tak Company was sold to CRC in 197966. It was the first time for CRC to 
step into the real estate market. Four developers then formed a consortium 
named Mightycity, in which CRC was the leading company holding 51% of 
shares. Following some further transactions and legal procedures, 
Mightycity successfully obtained the ownership of Luen Tak Company at a 
court-ordered auction and, thus, became the sole landholder of TSW. The 
land was de jure still under a lease between the colonial government and 
Luen Tak, but after Luen Tak’s composition was changed, Mightycity 
became the de facto landholder. As the land lease problem became a pressing 
concern, the participation of a Chinese-state owned enterprise in a project 
in the New Territories attracted the colonial government and London’s 
attention. When David Wilson, the political adviser to the Governor, 
reported this to London67, he characterized the auction as “essentially a legal 
technicality” and labelled the consortium as “a powerful grouping”68.  
 The land of TSW had three favorable conditions for development. 
Firstly, geomorphologically it was a flat area, and the 1977 report hinted 
that the government was planning to develop the surrounding areas. 
Secondly, the land was held by a single lessee, which made it easier for the 
developers to obtain. The consortium started to purchase Luen Tak’s shares 
by approaching an intermediary agent surnamed Chiu among the 
shareholders69, and it was only able to acquire 93% of the shares, but the 
law allowed it to seek the court’s order for a public auction of the remaining 
shares70. Thirdly, being neither tso nor tong land held by the indigenous 
villagers, TSW’s legal status was merely subject to the government lease. 
The complexities of the customary land system, entailing the legal 
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requirement of obtaining agreement from every single manager of the village 
community and the cultural concern about Fung Shui, were avoided.  
Consideration began at the local scale 
After informally expressing the development intention to the Secretary for 
the New Territories in late 1979, the consortium officially sought an 
approval for this new town proposal in 1980. The government felt that “the 
consortium is very anxious to cooperate with Government”71. After some 
exploratory meetings, the Executive Council discussed it on 20 May 1980, 
and then continued on 7 July 1981 and 4 May 1982, and drafted the 
agreement to be signed with Mightycity on 18 May 1982.  
 For the government, the proposed development did not violate the 
overall planning strategy because TSW “lies adjacent to one of the areas 
selected for study by the Special Committee on Land Production” [emphasis 
added]72. Involving the private sector could help solve the land shortage 
problem, so “a decision on Tin Shui Wai cannot be so easily be [sic] 
postponed”73. Director of New Territories Development commented that 
“Tin Shui Wai area offers the quickest and probably the cheapest 
opportunity for land production which is presently available in the New 
Territories”74. Thus, the government urged the importance of responding to 
the developers as soon as possible. 
 What rendered the proposal apparently complex was the 
involvement of the private developer with Chinese state background as the 
largest shareholder in the consortium at this politically critical moment after 
MacLehose’s Beijing visit. As the consortium already leaked their proposal 
to the general public through mass media, the government interpreted this 
might raise political concerns. It is noteworthy that the government 
conversely raised the land lease problem to the consortium. The developers 
would only have around ten years to sell the property, so the government 
asked “how they propose to deal with this question. They have not yet been 
prepared to give an answer, but it is not considered that the decision on 
whether permission should be given to develop should be linked to their 
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answer”75. The Executive Council decided that the government would co-
operate fully in the development study.  
Britain brought the plan to the international scale 
On the surface, the Executive Council seemed to have downplayed the 
political issues implied by the involvement of the Chinese red capital. But 
London and MacLehose indeed perceived the development proposal as a 
political move and regarded it as an opportunity to achieve their colonial 
goal, which was not made known to the Executive Council. MacLehose was 
often reluctant to disclose the politically sensitive information to the 
Legislative and Executive Councils76. The political concern was clear when 
David Wilson wrote, TSW “is probably the largest area of developable land 
in the New Territories under single ownership”, and “[w]e know much less 
than I would wish about the reasons behind the involvement of China 
Resources in this land deal”. Yet, Wilson as an experienced diplomat on 
Chinese affairs suggested that the evidence “tends to suggest that China 
Resources are in it purely to make money. They may not even have 
considered the political implication”77.  
 My following analysis shows the later reaction from the Chinese 
state affirmed Wilson’s opinion. But the local developers in the consortium, 
who self-claimed as CRC’s representatives, misguided Britain’s action. John 
Wu of Trafalgar Holdings, who was the only contact person between the 
consortium and the government, made two suggestions to the government. 
Firstly, the payment of land premiums involved in land use change should 
be spread over twenty years which would go beyond 1997. Secondly, there 
was no need to put the usual clause about the expiry date on the land lease 
because the consortium believed the status quo of Hong Kong would be 
maintained after 1997. For Wilson, these two “interesting” suggestions 
were unanticipated, and he requested London to study their implications78. 
Although Wu self-claimed to be instructed by CRC, Wilson did not fully 
trust him because this could not be verified and, more importantly, he could 
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not know “whether China Resources have any higher authority for what 
they are saying”79.  
 London did not put their heart at ease. London made clear, while 
land premiums and land use change are “a matter for the Executive Council 
at the local scale”, the political implications of the land lease concerned 
London80. Edward Youde, the then Deputy Under-Secretary for Asia and the 
Far East, alerted MacLehose to the significance of 1982 due to the fifteen-
year confidence crisis, and he should “use concrete cases (eg Tin Shui Wai) 
to build up an arrangement which would allow for land leases to run beyond 
1997”81.  
 Around that time, some local businessmen proposed to locate the 
new airport inside China. Both MacLehose and London suspected this 
proposal was endorsed by Beijing and were interested to see how Beijing 
was thinking about this. After Shenzhen was designated as a Special 
Economic Zone in 1979, London recognized an “evident Chinese policy of 
encouraging eventual ‘symbiosis’ of Hong Kong with southern Guangdong, 
through the development of industry etc around Shumchun and, perhaps, 
such projects as the China Resources-owned new town at Tin Shui Wai 
in the New Territories. We still need to calculate our attitude to such a 
process”82 [emphasis added]. London instructed MacLehose’s government 
to consult them before any liaising with the Chinese government unless 
issues are “purely technical”83. 
 Thus far, London did not directly exchange with the Chinese leaders, 
and MacLehose’s government also did not do so with CRC. When Lord 
Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, was planning to visit Beijing in March 
1981, MacLehose suggested to raise TSW and land lease problem, and “if 
Tin Shui Wai leases were to be discussed in Peking, the project as a whole 
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should have been approved by ExCo”84. But Britain did not need to wait 
until Carrington’s visit because of a dramatic development. After almost a 
year of paper talk, MacLehose’s government finally knew about China’s 
attitude through Edmund Lau, the General Manager of the Hongkong and 
Yaumati Ferry Company, who talked to Liao Chengzhih in Beijing in 
December 1980. Liao was “annoyed” by the involvement of CRC in TSW 
because CRC did not consult the Chinese leadership through Xinhua on this 
subject at all. Liao hoped the colonial government would not issue a beyond-
1997 land lease85. 
 This unexpected discovery prompted Britain to reformulate their 
strategy. Wilson, for the first time, talked to the Xinhua official about TSW. 
Li Jusheng, Xinhua’s Second Director, “denied that China Resources either 
had authority to ask for a special kind of lease or that they had done so”86. 
This had somehow ended Britain’s internal discussion. As Wilson remarked, 
“at the political level, the Chinese do not at present wish to use this 
opportunity to deal with the leases issue in an indirect manner”. An FCO 
official made a hand-written comment on Wilson’s letter that “[t]his is 
discouraging”. CRC was only motivated by the relatively low land cost in 
TSW87. Perhaps what was more shocking was Li’s viewpoints about Hong 
Kong. Li said, although China denied the “unequal treaties”, they 
constituted the present reality of Hong Kong. And, although CRC was a 
Chinese state enterprise, it operated as a company in accordance with local 
regulations, so it respects the legal framework of Hong Kong. Li suggested 
that “[t]he ‘large questions’ would certainly have to be discussed at some 
time and would be discussed. But the time was too early for this”. TSW was 
a “small question”, and Li hoped the colonial government not to use this to 
deal with the larger question. Li further criticized that “the third party”, 
which conceivably refers to the consortium, “must have misrepresented the 
position”.  
 Lu Ping, a key Chinese diplomat on Hong Kong affairs, even 
commented it was “the British Fantasy” to solve the land lease problem by 
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developing TSW, and the Chinese leadership was angry about CRC’s 
unpermitted investment, “you cannot take this land even if it was much 
cheaper because this concerns our basic stance”88. The archives of CRC also 
prove that they eventually reported the proposal to Beijing in late-December 
1980, which had then been challenged89. Probably for this reason, after Li’s 
meeting with Wilson, CRC for the very first time proactively sought a 
meeting with the colonial government in January 1981. CRC clarified that 
“they wished to develop the area in co-operation, and in accordance with 
the policies of the Hong Kong Government” and “had not thought about the 
leases aspect”. CRC also emphasized that TSW was a normal project, and 
they were willing to follow the normal practice of the government90. In short, 
Wu’s suggestion on beyond-1997 leases was not backed by the Chinese state. 
Ironically, Wu went to Beijing with a hope to meet Liao about this matter, 
but Liao did not entertain him in person. When London felt “these reflect 
the wishful thinking and fertile imagination of Hong Kong Chinese” 91 , 
Wilson commented that John Wu had “an over-optimistic interpretation of 
Chinese reaction”, and thus they should consider lease arrangement only if 
the suggestion “came from or through an official Chinese organisation”92. 
 After treating it at the international scale, London decided to rather 
tie back the local scale to TSW. While it was being handled by London, 
MacLehose clearly did not really have a say. Britain was obviously too 
optimistic and thought there was political significance about the land lease 
problem behind it. As the relevance to the land lease problem had been 
clarified, London instructed MacLehose to follow their normal procedures 
to process the proposal unless China were to have further moves. The 
urgency to approve the project before the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Beijing 
did not exist anymore. But TSW continued to be political because 
MacLehose tied the regional scale to this project.  
Spatial integration with Shenzhen at the regional scale 
MacLehose wanted to advance Hong Kong to a superior British colony which 
benefits China. He did not forgo the opportunity to favor China by 
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contributing TSW to the Pearl River Delta at a regional scale, offering 
economic and political advantages to Britain. As reported to the Executive 
Council on 7 July 1981, the development study proposed to develop TSW in 
three phases over 18 years, including residential and industrial 
development93. 
 MacLehose’s government was more than willing to cooperate with 
the developers. To reduce public works’ burden, while receiving land 
premium, government’s consultant proposed to grant land of equivalent 
value in the existing built area and retain the land of TSW as a land bank. 
But MacLehose’s government opposed because of political advantages from 
“having a major developer with the backing of the China Resources 
Company involved in a large-scale, long-term project in the New 
Territories”94. Although the government firmly stated that “it is known that 
China Resources participation is motivated entirely by commercial rather 
than by political reasons” [emphasis added]95, approving such a proposal 
“would demonstrate the practical advantages of combining the resources of 
Government and the private sector”96. The government concluded that such 
a cooperation with CRC can tell the society that the government was able 
to work with Chinese-related organizations.  
 For this reason, the government insisted to follow the consortium’s 
proposal to allocate part of TSW for private development, while the 
government would pay for the public works that connect to TSW and for 
resuming land for public housing and land bank. This significantly rejects 
the myth which wrongly perceived the land resumption as a sudden and 
inevitable decision to rescue CRC from a slump. The fact is that the 
government from the very beginning had been spending effort to persuade 
the consortium for allowing it to participate in the project to gain political 
advantages.  
 In MacLehose’s consideration, the political advantages were not only 
about the government’s capacity to cooperate with China, but also about the 
ways of supporting China’s economic reform. To understand the latter, 
MacLehose considered how the TSW proposal and potential cross-border 
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development could altogether generate a greater help to facilitate the flow 
of goods, people and money between Hong Kong and China, which was 
believed to be a necessary step to secure Britain’s interests in Hong Kong. 
Thus, regional development strategy also concerned MacLehose’s 
government to consider the transport infrastructural demands within the 
territory and with China. The existing road-based traffic corridor in the East 
(Shatin-Taipo-Lowu corridor) was considered inadequate. There was a 
proposal to build a new airport, though some local businessmen suggested 
locating it in China as mentioned in the previous section, the government 
preferred to construct it in Lantau Island, the largest and undeveloped island 
in Hong Kong located at the mouth of the Pearl River. For better access from 
the Kwai Chung container port and the proposed airport in Lantau to China, 
the government was planning a Western Corridor. For the government, the 
developers submitted a timely proposal because “the emphasis of 
development should be shifted to areas served by improved western corridor 
routes which would, in turn, provide improved traffic links to China”97. TSW 
spatially acted as a transportation hub for this Western Corridor. It also 
served the water-based traffic with the planning of a new port in Tuen Mun, 
currently River Trade Terminal, serving South China along the Pearl River. 
The first urban plan of TSW in 1983 allocated a considerable proportion of 
industrial land as storage and warehouse98. If TSW’s development followed 
this plan, the Terminal might have a higher usage rate now99. As part of the 
Western Corridor strategy, TSW was planned as a hub between China and 
the world, forming the network between the nodes at the factories in South 
China, the trading companies in Hong Kong, the customers abroad, the 
proposed airport, the container ports and the warehouses. In short, as 
MacLehose’s government suggested, “multiple benefit [sic] from 
unavoidable investment in infrastructure” would be achieved100.  
 As noted in the second section, limited resources in public finance 
had been a key constraint in urban development in Hong Kong. Public 
housing provision and new town development in the 1970s have “pulled 
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ahead of the necessary complementary improvements to transport 
systems” 101 . But the government never thought about forgoing TSW. 
Instead, TSW “may have to be given continuing priority, possibly at the 
expense of other more urgent or deserving undertakings”102. Although the 
government worked to liaison with the consortium, how the government 
should prepare for the public financial accounts for this unavoidable 
infrastructural investment in TSW became a challenge for John Bremridge, 
who became the Financial Secretary in June 1981103.  
 In view of rising public works demand and inflationary pressure on 
the construction industry, Bremridge had to better manage the public works 
programme. The Legislative Council approved Bremridge’s proposal to 
establish a Capital Works Reserve Fund (CWRF) with effect from 1 April 
1982104. The principles were to abandon the “annuality” approach and to 
adopt a project-based approach to finance the public works. CWRF is funded 
by transferring a proportion of money from both the general recurrent 
revenue and land sales in the public finance accounts105. Judge Godfrey in 
his judgement of a dispute about TSW declared that introducing CWRF and 
relevant procedural changes were “central to the history of the reclamation 
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Large question at the international scale, small question at the 
local scale 
In May 1982, a few days before Edward Youde took over MacLehose’s office, 
the Executive Council approved the agreement107. The managerial officials 
of CRC signed the agreement on behalf of Mightycity on 29 July 1982. The 
agreement followed what MacLehose’s government had been proposing 
since the beginning. After the government resumes the land from 
Mightycity, the Northern part would be retained as a land bank and the 
Southern part would be developed; in which a part would be leased back to 
Mightycity for private development, and other parts would be public 
housing and social facilities. Interestingly, the government assured the 
public that TSW had nothing to deal with politics and the Chinese 
government and the Guangdong Province were not consulted108.  
 Nevertheless, TSW still has its political significance as revealed by 
two observations. Firstly, the expiry date of land lease in 1997 was not 
publicly disclosed, although the government re-leased the land to Mightycity 
on a 99-year lease term commencing in 1898 and the development phases 
would go beyond 1997. The government might not want to further trigger 
the confidence crisis. As Judge Godfrey commented that 
[o]ne important matter of background, not touched on in the press 
release, does however need to be added; that is that, in 1982, no-
one could be certain what rights would subsist in land in the New 
Territories after 1997. (It was generally believed in Hong Kong in 
1982 that rights in land subsisting in 1997 would, in one way or 
another, be extended so as to continue after 1997. But it was to be 
1984 before the uncertainty was resolved.)109. 
Secondly, in August 1982, CRC wrote to Beijing that “after our negotiation 
with the British Hong Kong government over the land development of Tin 
Shui Wai for more than one and a half year, with several twists and turns, 
 
107 “Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Executive Council of Hong Kong Held in 
the Council Chamber on Tuesday, 4th May 1982”, M(82)16, HKRS261-11-1: 
Executive Council Papers (Secret & Confidential) For Half Year Ending 30th June 
1982. 1982; “Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the Executive Council of Hong Kong 
Held in the Council Chamber on Tuesday, 18th May 1982”, M(82)18, HKRS261-
11-1. 
108 “Government Spent $2.2 Billion to Resume Tin Shui Wai” (trans.), Kung Sheung 
Daily News, 30 July 1982.  
109  [1992]HKCFI96: Tin Shui Wai Development LTD v. Attorney General; 
HCCT5/1987. 30 September 1992. 
 28 
both parties finally signed the agreement on 29th July”110 . CRC trickily 
emphasized that the area for private development would be serviced land 
which the government would grant to them free of charge and bear the 
infrastructural cost111. This might have misled Beijing because the land was 
not free of charge, though the land premium was deducted from the 
government’s payment. CRC also justified that their involvement in TSW 
had put the investors’ hearts at ease.  
 Whereas TSW was a small question about local development, it was 
strongly associated with the large question between Britain and China. This 
explains why the deal must be reached in July 1982, two months before 
Thatcher’s Beijing visit. As the CRC archives documented, Thatcher told 
Deng that “the question of Tin Shui Wai has been solved” before the Sino-
British negotiations started.  
Conclusion 
This article explains why the colonial government had to resume TSW and 
develop it in a partnership with the consortium. It debunks the “Tin Shui 
Wai Myth” which is shown to be a time-capsule account that detaches the 
vital scalar processes from the facts. Through the lens of scalar politics, the 
account goes beyond the static conception of scale in analyzing the socio-
spatial dynamics of new town planning and development. While legal 
arrangements and political reactions reconfigured and transformed the 
inter-scalar relations, the land lease, which had been enacted, modified, 
transacted and contested, mattered in shaping spatiality and power relations. 
These power relations created the scalar politics, shifting between the 
governor and London, between the government and developers, between 
red capital and Beijing, and between Britain and China. As a result of the 
scalar politics, the land transaction in 1982 had nothing to deal with market 
slump.  
 This planning episode adds new knowledge to this chapter of “the 
gap period” between those two critical moments in the story of Hong Kong. 
Firstly, this case study reveals a spatial dimension of diplomatic relations. 
Diplomatic negotiations are not only high-level interactions between state 
powers about territorial disputes, political agenda or ideological conflicts, 
but could also have impacts on, and being influenced by, the ongoing urban 
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transformation within the territory. Secondly, it enriches our understanding 
of the local politics of colonial governance, especially the distance between 
the governor and the local people. While some in Hong Kong might feel 
nostalgia for the colonial days with improved living quality and rapid 
economic growth, this case demonstrates how the colonial authority’s 
decision-making process had foregrounded their self-interest, excluding 
both the public and even the closely related members in the Councils from 
knowing the real political calculation and plans. The local people could play 
central roles in neither the planning process of TSW nor the Sino-British 
Negotiations. Thirdly, the case of TSW sheds light on the political economy 
of Hong Kong and China in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. At the 
beginning of the economic reform, both sides knew very little about another 
across the border, giving rise to many fantasies of securing interests and 
earning from the business environment. Only through real interactions and 
confrontations, they could learn more about each other before adopting the 
right strategy to realize their desired objectives.  
 What motivated the developers to invite CRC deserves a remark. 
Albeit staying in the background, Li Ka-Shing and other developers, I 
speculate, wanted to assess the investment environment in the 1980s. 
Undoubtedly these people later became co-opted into Beijing’s united front 
and are still influential in the urban politics of Hong Kong. But, before that, 
they were feeling the full brunt of the lease problem because they had been 
hoarding land in the New Territories. While China had no idea about the 
problem at all, and Britain was seemingly optimistic to rely on the treaties, 
the perception that both China and Britain remained silent alerted the local 
capitalists to the great uncertainty. As it was clear that CRC has a strong 
background of the Chinese state and wanted to make money, these 
developers attempted to take advantage of CRC to tease out possible 
solutions. They self-claimed to be the representative of CRC. CRC enjoyed 
favorable conditions that Cheung Kong promised CRC can share the profit 
without taking responsibility for the financial cost. Consequently, CRC, 
whose decision originally annoyed Beijing, withdrew from the project after 
the sovereignty transfer, when Hong Kong’s confidence crisis was settled on 
the surface.  
 Planning failures cannot explain TSW’s problems. The 1983 master 
plan of its southern part included a balanced land uses pattern which could 
facilitate a reasonable urban life. But urban planning and development are 
full of uncertainties. The later development of TSW was complicated by its 
historical geography. For example, border disputes between China and 
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Hong Kong in the late 1980s delayed the supply of reclamation materials112, 
decreasing industrial demand due to rapid industrial relocation to mainland 
China led to modification of the plan, and a very large proportion of land 
bank in the northern part was used to build public housing without 
adequate provision of social facilities because of the altered political agenda 
of housing provision after the sovereignty transfer in 1997.  
 TSW was the first time for the colonial government to consider the 
factor of benefiting China in plan-making, which is now normalized in Hong 
Kong under the new constitutional order of “One Country, Two Systems”. 
Recent debates on new town development in Hong Kong frequently aroused 
fears about creating another TSW based on the problematic myth. As the 
government under Chinese sovereignty agrees and blames the colonial 
government for TSW’s problems, it can readily be acquitted of those charges 
against the controversies of regional integration with mainland China by 
assuring a good plan-making process. In view of the current controversies 
about regional development and integration between mainland China and 
Hong Kong, debates should be politicized to decipher what lies behind 
urban plans. This is to ask through what processes, and for what reasons, 
land injustice in Hong Kong was produced and is perpetuated (for example, 
the tremendous reform of CWRF during the negotiations)113. Likewise, 
scrutinizing the underlying stories is necessary for analyses of urban plans, 
everywhere in the world, in urban planning research. 
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